The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IV, Issue 13 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
1999-08-31
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IV, Issue
13
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11926
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 4, Number 13 (August 31, 1999) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Allow me to introduce the next president 
Sergei Stepashin deserved better than this. He clearly accepted the position of 
prime minister only hesitatingly in May, but once given the job he did attempt to 
function normally, despite the nearly constant interference in government affairs 
by various factions anxious to create toeholds for leverage in the upcoming 
elections. While there are few accomplishments one can point to during his 
tenure as prime minister, he did secure the required international loans and 
prevent further internal destabilization. Stepashin's main problem seems to have 
been that he was judged by the Kremlin to be politically unreliable. His dismissal 
signals that the government's mandate to protect the reform process is no longer 
of primary importance. At issue now is the survival of the "Family." 
 
Most analyses suggest that the Kremlin had two concerns with Stepashin. 
Dagestan, and the re-emergence of Shamil Basaev, raised the question of 
Stepashin's ability to resolve the conflict in the North Caucasus. Having lost his 
job as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in 1995 over the mishandling 
of a Chechen hostage raid, Stepashin is perceived to be weak on the Chechen 
issue. That alone probably would not have prompted his dismissal however. It 
has been widely reported that Yel'tsin sought the removal of Stepashin as soon 
as news broke of the alliance between Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland 
movement and the regional All-Russia movement. The Kremlin apparently 
wanted Stepashin to exert federal pressure on the regional governors who 
belong to All-Russia, in order to prevent the alliance with Fatherland. 
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Much of the most credible commentary regarding Yel'tsin's dismissal of 
Stepashin attributes electoral motives to the decision. In addition to preventing 
the consolidation of hostile political movements, control over both media and 
financial resources is key to providing positive electoral outcomes. While the 
apparat, in the person of Alexandr Voloshin, has launched personal attacks on 
Luzhkov and his financial supporter Vladimir Gusinsky, the force of government 
is required to have substantial impact on their economic resources. Stepashin 
was reportedly asked to fire the head of Gazprom, which owns 49 percent of 
Gusinsky's NTV, and to cancel NTV's broadcast license. (ARGUMENT I FAKTY, 
3 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0804, via World News Connection) While the Putin-
led government has not yet moved to fulfill these purported Kremlin requests, 
Yel'tsin did issue a decree which transferred 35 percent of Gazprom's stock to 
the state in order to "ensure the country's economic security." (INTERFAX, 1020 
GMT, 9 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0809, via World News Connection) 
 
Stepashin's most recent post-government move, to align with Grigori Yavlinsky's 
Yabloko party, seems to confirm the Kremlin's concerns about his political 
intentions. Yavlinsky has never been a supporter of the Yel'tsin regime and would 
be unlikely to provide Yel'tsin and his extended "Family" with the much-needed 
guarantees of immunity should he succeed Yel'tsin as president. 
 
The man Yel'tsin named to replace Stepashin, Vladimir Putin, was brought to 
Moscow by Anatoli Chubais following the 1996 presidential elections. Prior to the 
move, Putin, who spent many years in the KGB, was first deputy mayor to Anatoli 
Sobchak. In an interesting side note, Sobchak just recently returned to Russia 
after spending several months abroad for medical treatment. His absence 
delayed prosecutorial inquiry into a corruption probe of the St. Petersburg 
administration. Sobchak reportedly returned after receiving assurances from then 
acting Procurator General (and Putin's new Justice Minister) Yuri Chaika. These 
assurances have been likened by some to immunity, although Sobchak claims 
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that Chaika only promised to deal with him in accordance with the law. 
(INTERFAX, 16 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
Putin joined the presidential administration in 1996 as a deputy to Pavel Borodin, 
with whom he is said to have long been friends. (MOSCOW NEWS, 10 Oct 96; 
via nexis) By 1998, Putin had been named to head up the FSB, which seemed in 
relative decline compared to the Stepashin-led Ministry of the Interior (MVD). 
 
Putin's fortunes apparently turned at about the time a strong counterattack was 
needed against Procurator Skuratov's investigations into Kremlin corruption. A 
report in Novye izvestia (9 Apr 99; via nexis) describes the workings of the FSB's 
12 Department, which "monitors" the activities of leading officials and, Novye 
izvestia claims, made the compromising video of Skuratov, which provided the 
pretext for Yel'tsin's dismissal of the procurator. 
 
Regardless of the manner in which Putin proved himself to the Yel'tsin "Family," it 
has become clear that he has joined the tight circle of close advisers. An analysis 
of the workings of this Kremlin clique in Obshchaya gazeta (No. 29, July 1997; 
via nexis) notes that Putin joined Voloshin, Tatiana Dyachenko and Anatoli 
Chubais in weekly meetings with the prime minister during Stepashin's regime. (It 
is unlikely that this was the practice during Primakov's tenure.) 
 
Putin's mandate as prime minister could not be more clear: Use the authority of 
the government to ensure the defeat or marginalization of the Kremlin's political 
opponents and assist in the creation of the most favorable conditions possible for 
the "Family" to select the next president of Russia. Yel'tsin, in introducing Putin, 
suggested he would make an appropriate successor president, but Yel'tsin 
endorsements are ambivalent and fleeting pronouncements. Perhaps Putin will 
survive until next year and retain the support of the Kremlin, perhaps he will be 
needed as a convenient scapegoat for some as yet unknown scandal. What is 
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likely is that the "Family" will plow ahead, rather ham-handedly attempting to 
control the many pesky democratic variables that an election entails. 
 
The desperation of the president and his advisers suggests that there is far more 
at stake than a concern for historical legacy and investigations of financial 
misappropriations. Apparently, the Family must ensure a sympathetic successor 
because the next occupant will have access to damning information. So, while 
Yel'tsin's latest personnel maneuver united both critics and sympathizers from all 
ends of the political spectrum to denounce his actions as "madness" (Nemtsov) 
and "100 percent lunacy" (Zyuganov), their diagnosis is incorrect. This is not 
insanity, it is instinct, survival instinct. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
The Russian government has long been able to use an aggressive foreign policy 
as a means both to extract political concessions from Western nations and to 
ensure the continued flow of aid to its ailing and corrupt economy. An explosive 
scandal implicating high authorities in Moscow, however, appeared likely to 
undermine Russian credibility in West, and, paradoxically, to give the Kremlin 
fewer reasons to make pro-Western gestures abroad. As aid appeared 
threatened, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin dropped all pretenses of 
cooperation, going so far as to promise a renewed "fight with the West." 
 
Bank loans imperiled by scandal 
Russia's attempts to restructure its debt to the West and receive critical IMF 
funding were imperiled in late August by credible reports that the Russian Mafia 
had stolen and laundered billions of dollars from previous credits. Congressmen 
charged with regulating the American banking industry called for a moratorium on 
future IMF payments. 
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The scandal, first brought to light in a series of reports in The New York Times, 
erupted just as Russian officials were attempting to parlay Moscow's recent 
diplomatic cooperation with the West into new loans. It appeared likely to 
discount efforts to portray the Russian government as a friend worthy of 
continued Western support. 
 
On 19 August The New York Times reported that, from October 1998 to March 
1999, $4.2 billion had flowed through a Bank of New York account purportedly 
controlled by reputed Russian gangster Semyon Yukovich Mogilevich. (The New 
York Times, 19 Aug 99; via nexis) The funds went to a variety of businesses 
listed on American and Russian stock exchanges. Later reports suggested that 
close associates of President Boris Yel'tsin might have been involved in diverting 
the funds from Western loans. (The Independent, 27 Aug 99; via nexis) 
 
The report seemed likely to derail a major Russian argument for debt relief -- 
namely, that the Russian economy had been so badly ravaged by the currency 
devaluation of August 1998 that new aid was needed. Authorities suspected that 
the hard currency moving through the Bank of New York account had come from 
the $4.5 billion in loans the IMF offered in the wake of the currency crash, which 
authorities said was spent within weeks of its transfer. 
 
On the day the first New York Times article appeared, Aleksandr Livshits, 
Russia's envoy for relations with the G-7, pleaded that Russia needed to 
"balance its economic and political relations with Western partners due to 
changes [that] occurred in Russia after the August 1998 crisis." In an apparent 
reference to Russian diplomacy during the Kosovo war, Livshits said Russia had 
demonstrated its helpfulness in resolving military and economic crises. (ITAR-
TASS, 1610 GMT, 19 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0819, via World News 
Connection) 
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A $640 million tranche of current IMF loans was due to be released in 
September, but Jim Leach, chairman of the banking committee of the US House 
of Representatives, called for a moratorium on all lending, and promised a 
thorough investigation of the Bank of New York. "The question," Leach said, "is 
whether they were unwittingly duped or were willing facilitators in what may be 
the greatest example of kleptocratic governance in modern history." (THE 
INDEPENDENT, 27 Aug 99; via nexis) 
 
Previous engagements 
The financial scandal erupted shortly before Yel'tsin was to appear in Bishkek for 
a meeting with representatives of Central Asian nations, a venue in which 
Russian officials are inclined to make anti-Western statements of the sort not 
usually heard during visits to Brussels. It was therefore difficult to assess whether 
Yel'tsin's belligerent tone among his Asian cohorts was business as usual, or 
whether the threats to Western aid caused him to feel less restrained than ever. 
 
Before Yel'tsin's trip east, the Russian government had been steadily pursuing its 
long-term (and effective) strategy of playing its post-Cold War ties for more 
concessions from the West. For at least five years, the Russian government has 
been able to use weak positions in ongoing relations as hostages for changes 
that suit it. The Start-II and Start-III treaties, for example, are of little relevance to 
Western security since they promise to cull an arsenal of Russian ballistic 
missiles that has already been ravaged by poor maintenance. Russian officials, 
such as State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin, were 
nonetheless determined to link the treaties' approval to American concessions on 
a new antiballistic missile system for Japan. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 19 Aug 99) 
 
In a similar vein, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin 
insisted again that the future of his nation's cooperation with NATO depended on 
the alliance acting in accord with the wishes of the United Nations Security 
Council. Although Russia was extended the right to attend sessions of the 
 7 
Russian-NATO Permanent Joint Council on the understanding that Moscow 
would have a "voice, not a veto," Rakhmanin insisted that Russia 's relations with 
the alliance would remain frozen (with the exception of work in Kosovo) until "the 
alliance fully take[s] into account our lawful interests and concerns and strictly 
follow[s] the provisions of the Russia-NATO founding act." (INTERFAX, 1128 
GMT, 5 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0805, via World News Connection) 
 
Multipolarism rides high at Shanghai-Five 
At the fourth Shanghai-Five (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan) meeting in Bishkek on 23-24 August, Russia sang what is rapidly 
becoming that same old tune. Unsurprisingly, the dominant theme was 
improvement of regional security through increased economic and security 
cooperation. More simply put, the theme was multipolarism. Over the past few 
months, Russia has taken every opportunity to hammer home its policy. In 
Bishkek, Yel'tsin himself made the most blatant jab at unipolarism saying that he 
was "ready to fight" the "westerners" who supported a unipolar world. Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov later tidied up Yel'tsin's statement saying that Russia 
"has and will come out against 'unipolarism' in the future." (TASS, 1202 GMT, 25 
Aug 99; via nexis) 
 
Since the first meeting of the group in Shanghai in 1996, the five nations have 
progressively made efforts to improve relations first through border 
demilitarization and now through economic and security cooperation efforts. 
Russia and China, who act as the Five's elder siblings, separately have been 
mending bilateral fences over the past few years, most notably through their 
strategic cooperative partnership and economic trade initiatives. (See The NIS 
Observed, 12 Jul 99) Under the new Bishkek Declaration signed this month, the 
Shanghai-Five nations will have irregular meetings between their governments at 
the foreign and defense levels to exchange views. The next meeting has already 
been scheduled for May 2000 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. (XINHUA, 0908 GMT, 25 
Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0826, via World News Connection) 
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Much ado ... has changed nothing 
The Japanese rumor mill is churning again amidst a government reshuffling 
which has placed a Sakhalin-born statesman at the helm of the Japanese 
embassy in Moscow. In late August, the Japanese press reported that Japan was 
"considering" a compromise "interim" Russo-Japanese treaty that excluded a 
solution to the Kurile Islands territorial issue. (JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, 
24 Aug 99; via nexis) According to the Japanese government, the rumor was 
false and consultations with Russia on the issue will be continued later in the fall. 
A similar rumor that surfaced last fall was also false. The contentious territorial 
issue has stymied Russo-Japanese relations throughout the 1990s and has been 
compounded by recent US efforts to develop a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 
system in Japan. 
 
Minoru Tamba's appointment as the new ambassador to Russia could be a 
Japanese attempt to reinvigorate Russo-Japanese talks. Tamba, who is currently 
the Japanese first deputy foreign minister in charge of Russian affairs, was 
Japan's lead negotiator during the 1997 Yel'tsin-Hashimoto meetings at which 
the two nations agreed to resolve the territorial issue and conclude a peace 
treaty by 2000. He is highly regarded by his Russian counterparts as an 
"experienced career diplomat, well-versed in Russian affairs." (ITAR-TASS, 0735 
GMT, 13 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0813, via World News Connection) In 
essence, Tamba may be someone with whom Russia can work; however, even if 
he is, he is crippled by time and will, since he will not assume his post until 
October, and Yel'tsin is still stalling on a fall summit date. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
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Stepashin to stand in single-member district in Petersburg 
Not willing to risk inclusion on a party list as the only vehicle for entering the 
Duma, former prime minister Sergei Stepashin has announced he will run for 
election in his home Krasnoselsky district in St. Petersburg. The new electoral 
law now allows the first three names on party lists to run simultaneously in single-
member districts, and the party powerful of all colors are taking advantage of this. 
Across the board the same small group of politicians is on the lists and in the 
districts, guaranteeing that the inner circle of charmed and influential politicians 
continues to shrink day by day, election by election. (INTERFAX, 0955 GMT, 17 
Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-99-0817, via World News Connection) 
 
Putin's candidacy sails through Duma 
After the gut-wrenching and posturing Duma debates over Yel'tsin's previous 
candidates for prime minister, Vladimir Putin's speedy confirmation was almost 
anticlimactic. Duma chairman Gennadi Seleznev said that deputies did not want 
to "aggravate the situation" and so Putin was confirmed. What is the "situation" 
which the Duma did not want to aggravate? Seleznev mentioned the 
deteriorating state of affairs in the North Caucasus as well as the nation's chronic 
financial problems. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 9 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0809, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Another explanation is that Yel'tsin, and this Duma, are lame ducks. The Duma is 
engrossed in preparations for the upcoming elections, and because the 
government will have to resign upon the seating of the new Duma anyway, who 
cares who is prime minister? Not that this Duma has been particularly 
cooperative with the Yel'tsin administration in the past anyway, but with elections 
looming even less cooperation can be expected in the future. 
 
CEC chairman discusses election rules 
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Campaigns are not legally allowed to commence until the president has issued 
his decree naming the date for the Duma elections. Yel'tsin has established that 
19 December 1999 will be the election date. Registration has now begun, but 
only for those parties, associations or blocs that registered one year prior to the 
election date. The justice ministry qualified 139 parties, blocs, etc. which may 
now register for the elections in December. This solves, for now, the question as 
to whether Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland party should be qualified to 
run ... almost. There remains discussion over the definition of "one year." 
Luzhkov's party registered on 19 December 1999, but the question is whether 18 
December 1999 should be the cut-off date. Presently, the 19th is the official date, 
so Fatherland is in the race. 
 
Because Yel'tsin has named the date for the upcoming elections, the qualified 
electoral associations and blocs must now collect 200,000 signatures or make an 
"electoral deposit" of two million rubles in order for the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) to register the candidates; however, according to the law, this 
cannot begin before 25 September. Registered party lists will be provided to the 
media and will be posted on the Internet, as will copies of candidates' income 
declarations for 1998, details on any pending criminal charges, and information 
on whether the candidate holds a foreign passport. With the help of the 
government, the CEC plans to verify the information provided by the candidates 
and parties. 
 
With regard to the parties themselves, whomever they chose to place in the first, 
second, or third place on their lists is their business. However, if anyone from the 
top three positions on the party list resigns of his "own accord," the whole list will 
be disqualified. Also, if more than 25 percent of the electoral list voluntarily drops 
out, the entire list will be disqualified. (Federal Information Systems Corporation, 
OFFICIAL KREMLIN INTERNATIONAL NEWS BROADCAST, 24 Aug 99; via 
nexis) 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James J. Duke Jr. 
 
Kosovo campaign fallout 
Fallout from Operation Allied Force continues. With the exception of the Russian 
peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo, Russia-NATO relations essentially have 
been frozen since April. Russia's actions include boycotting the NATO-sponsored 
Peace Shield '99 exercise, establishing new budget priorities, reorganizing air 
defense missile production, and calls for a more visible naval presence. Russia's 
post-NATO bombing campaign actions reflect its continuing frustration at being 
unable to affect events on the world stage to the extent desired. 
 
Russia skips peacekeeping maneuvers 
Russia boycotted Peace Shield '99, a multinational peacekeeping exercise 
staged under NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Peace Shield '99, staged 
at the Yavorsky training range outside Lvov, Ukraine in August, involved over 
1,300 servicemen from 14 NATO and East European countries. Seven other 
countries sent military attachés to observe. The 11-day exercise's objectives 
involved training a multinational contingent in peacekeeping operations following 
an ethnic conflict. (ITAR-TASS, 1744 GMT, 4 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0804, via 
World News Connection) Peace Shield started in 1995 as a bilateral US-Ukraine 
peacekeeping exercise, and by 1998 Russia participated for the first time. (ITAR-
TASS, 1148 GMT, 4 Feb 98; FBIS-UMA-98-035, via World News Connection) 
Computers drove the exercise's scenario, so the military impact of Russia's 
absence probably was negligible. Russia's non-participation was a political 
statement against NATO's bombing campaign. 
 
Funding levels said to remain at 1999 numbers 
Events in Yugoslavia also prompted Russia's political leadership to announce 
new budget priorities. Former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin stated Russia 
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needs "eyes and ears in space," and Russia's defense capability is no longer 
comparable to other countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1210 GMT, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0806, via World News Connection) Russian President Boris Yel'tsin also 
said year 2000 armed forces funding would not fall below 1999 levels. 
(INTERFAX, 0803 GMT, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0806, via World News 
Connection) In addition, Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov supports maintaining 
defense spending at 1999 levels and funding peacekeeping operations in 
Kosovo. (ITAR-TASS, 0844 GMT, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0806, via World 
News Connection) However, previous economic crises led to austerity measures 
which precluded fully funding Russian defense budgets. Meager, underfunded 
defense budgets will prevent any significant change to Russia's defense posture. 
 
Air defense contractors plan joint production efforts 
Russian air defense producers also seized upon NATO's bombing campaign to 
announce plans for more capable Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). Rossiyskaya 
gazeta reported Russia's air defense developers have reorganized themselves 
around the Almaz Science and Production Association, Russia's air defense 
design bureau. Approximately 20 companies plan via joint efforts to produce 
systems capable of countering US and NATO airpower. The systems are 
intended for homeland defense and competition in the arms export market. The 
corporation plans to update the S-300 SAM to a more capable S-400, and offer 
the S-300 for foreign sales. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0806, via World News Connection) 
 
Navy commander calls for return to Mediterranean 
Following NATO's bombing campaign, the Russian Navy commander, Admiral 
Vladimir Kuroedov, called for the Navy's return to the Mediterranean. Kuroedov 
noted the significant number of sea-launched cruise missile and aircraft attacks 
which could be opposed with SAMs launched from Russian Navy vessels. He 
also highlighted the political impact of a forward naval presence in volatile spots. 
(INTERFAX, 1304 GMT, 7 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0807, via World News 
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Connection) Kuroedov is probably reminiscing about the days when the Soviet 
Navy patrolled the Mediterranean. Despite the commander's aspirations, the 
Russian Navy's ability to influence events outside of coastal waters with 
conventional weapons is limited. Although early press reports announced 
preparations to send up to seven Russian ships to the Adriatic during Operation 
Allied Force, Russia only sent one reconnaissance ship. Recently Russian naval 
units have maintained a limited training cycle and would be hard-pressed to 
sustain a fleet outside of normal operating areas. Nonetheless one ship gave 
Russia an inexpensive way to demonstrate support for a "traditional" ally. 
 
While budget concerns might limit training to some degree, exercises do 
continue. The Baltic Fleet commenced large-scale maneuvers dubbed "West-99" 
with mine identification training off Baltijsk and Leningrad. In all, 40 Navy vessels, 
40 logistics ships, and 50 aircraft were scheduled to participate. An amphibious 
assault was also scheduled along with gun and missile firings. (ITAR-TASS, 
0943 GMT, 3 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0803, via World News Connection) These 
exercises appear similar to previous Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific fleet 
maneuvers. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Persistence is a virtue 
In his first success as CIS executive chairman, Yuri Yarov has reduced his CIS 
executive staff by 50 percent, leaving 711 staff positions within the executive 
structure. (TURAN, 1440 GMT, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0806, via World News 
Connection) However, this year-long project was the easy part: The substantive 
issues of economic and military cooperation remain unresolved. During the past 
two CIS meetings of heads of state and government, these issues were lost in 
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the political fray caused by polarization among the CIS member states. (See The 
NIS Observed, 14 Jul 99) 
 
If persistence doesn't work, call in the big guy 
With another set of CIS meetings quickly approaching in October, Yarov has 
begun to take a different approach to getting things done. After meeting with 
Yel'tsin in late August, he has announced that the CIS Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
will begin on 1 January 2000, since a number of presidentially supported "tasks" 
depend on FTZ implementation. (ITAR-TASS, 0821 GMT, 19 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0820, via World News Connection) By taking this approach, Yarov has 
unabashedly confirmed his subservience to the Russian president. But, he has 
also shown that he knows how things really get accomplished in the CIS. In order 
for the FTZ to function, all 12 members of the CIS must theoretically approve the 
FTZ. At the last CIS Heads of Government meeting in June, WTO standards 
created an impasse between Customs Union members and non-Union members. 
Yarov's unilateral announcement on the heels of his meeting with Yel'tsin carries 
weight since Russia is a key Customs Union member. Thus, if Yel'tsin supports 
FTZ, then the chances of some form of a Free Trade Zone being implemented in 
January 2000 -- regardless of how ineffective it may be -- are raised. 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
United we stand ... for now 
Four of the candidates opposing President Leonid Kuchma in October's 
presidential election have apparently been watching the polls. On 25 August, 
Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko, former speaker and Socialist leader 
Oleksandr Moroz, former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, and Cherkasy Mayor 
Vlodymyr Oliynyk announced the formation of a joint candidacy. The four 
announced that they would pool their resources to improve the chances that one 
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of them will win in the first round. (DEUTSCHE-PRESSE AGENTUR, 1208 CET, 
25 Aug 99; via nexis) Although they gave no specifics about how this would be 
done, they said it would ensure that one of them wins on 31 October. 
 
Tkachenko explained, "In response to our move, one of our candidates -- whom 
we will name later -- will get a vast majority of votes, and the second round will 
not be needed." The joint candidate will reportedly be announced by the middle 
of October. (KYIV POST, 24 Aug 99) 
 
Whether the four can actually choose one of them to represent this new coalition 
is the first major question, of course. But it is the second question that may be 
the most difficult to deal with: If they did choose one of them, would anyone 
care? 
 
Oliynyk is a local politician new to the national spotlight. Moroz is clearly the most 
popular of the group, but his support in opinion polls has generally registered 
only in the single digits. Tkachenko appears to be viewed negatively by most 
potential voters, at least in public, receiving under three percent of the support in 
most polls, while Marchuk is well-known but his candidacy has simply not caught 
fire. Despite the media frenzy that appears to have greeted the announcement of 
this coalition, it is possible that the coalition candidate may be unable to 
challenge even Communist Party leader Pyotr Simonenko or Progressive 
Socialist Party head Natalya Vitrenko, not to mention Kuchma. Although polls are 
often unreliable, particularly when dealing with leftist candidates, most Ukrainians 
seem to echo what one pensioner told a reporter from Reuters, "I am not for 
anyone. No one does anything for ordinary people." (REUTERS, 20 Aug 99; via 
Russia Today) Kuchma shouldn't have anything to worry about. What's the point 
in changing the president if the change won't change anything? 
 
Where, oh where, has our hryvnya gone? 
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The hryvnya plunged again this month -- albeit temporarily this time. Although the 
currency had been stable for several months, it took only a gentle nudge from the 
energy sector to send it into decline once again. On 6 August, the currency 
dropped as low as 5.25 to the dollar, from its previous level of 3.9. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1209 EDT, 6 Aug 99; via nexis) The major culprit was 
later said to be the country's fuel shortage. National Bank Chairman Viktor 
Yushchenko explained, "The reason is not in the hryvnya, and not in the currency 
market. It's in the increased demand for dollars to sign new fuel import deals." 
 
Following its prescribed IMF medicine, Ukraine refused to intervene in the 
currency market until finally purchasing almost $10 million to help stop the 
decline. As of 13 August, the hryvnya had stabilized at 4.54 to the dollar, slightly 
inside the government's exchange corridor of 3.4 - 4.6. 
 
The currency problems, however, have made it even more difficult for Ukraine to 
pay both its internal and external debt, and caused Moody's to warn investors of 
a possible debt default by Ukraine. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 Aug 99; via nexis) 
 
Ukraine has admitted that the country does not have enough cash reserves to 
pay its debts, but is counting on the next tranches of its IMF and World Bank 
loans to stave off debt default and help it pay a portion of its wage arrears. The 
country is also counting on using some of its sugar harvest to pay pensioners, 
and a significant portion of its grain harvest to pay energy suppliers. It may be 
counting its chickens a little early, however. The grain harvest season has been 
hampered by a lack of fuel, making it likely to be the worst since the country's 
independence, and the IMF tranche is anything but a certainty. 
 
The country's coal miners, meanwhile, aren't counting on anything. The 
Independent Miners' Trade Union has threatened to interrupt coal supplies if 
back wages, totaling over $400 million, are not paid by September. (RFE/RL 
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NEWSLINE, 16 Aug 99) This would only exacerbate the energy crisis, of course, 
and perhaps nudge the hryvnya into yet another decline. 
 
It is worth noting that despite the energy crisis, which is helping to worsen the 
economic crisis, there was no action this month on the promise by G-7 nations to 
help Ukraine finish construction of two new nuclear reactors at the Rivne and 
Khmelnitsky plants. 
 
BELARUS 
Who, oh who, is our president? 
The situation in Belarus just gets stranger ... or more frightening, depending on 
your point of view. On 27 August, the Belarusian opposition declared Semyon 
Sharetsky to be the lawful president of Belarus. Sharetsky, who fled to Lithuania 
after being threatened with arrest by the KGB in Belarus, announced from Vilnius 
that he is now in the process of forming a new government, and that Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka is now an "ordinary citizen." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 27 Aug 99; 
via nexis) According to the 1994 Belarusian constitution recognized by Sharetsky 
and most Western countries, Lukashenka's term of office expired on 20 July. 
 
Lukashenka, still in Minsk, ignored Sharetsky's statement. Belarus did, however, 
protest the assistance being given to Sharetsky by Lithuania -- most notably 
armed guards and housing -- saying the actions may damage relations between 
the two countries. (LIETUVOS RYTAS, 26 Aug 99; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via nexis) Lithuania largely ignored Belarus' statement. 
 
Meanwhile, Mikhail Chyhir, the former Belarusian premier and opposition activist, 
remains in prison in Minsk, charged with larceny but not officially indicted. At the 
same time, Uladzimir Antonaw, head of the Young Front (the youth branch of the 
Belarusian People's Front) recently fled to Poland and requested asylum. He 
explained that he believed his life to be in danger. (BELAPAN, 1125 GMT, 4 Aug 
99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
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Against this backdrop, the OSCE is planning to mediate talks between the 
president's working group and representatives of the opposition. If Lukashenka 
can just delay the talks for a while, perhaps he'll win by default; there simply 
won't be any opposition representatives left with whom to talk. 
 
MOLDOVA 
My buddy, my pal 
Just when it seemed that Ukraine's decision to reduce the amount of electricity 
supplied to Moldova had worsened relations between the two, the countries last 
week took an important step forward. On 18 August, Presidents Petru Lucinschi 
and Leonid Kuchma signed two major documents: a border treaty and a protocol 
detailing a small territory swap between the countries. These two documents 
have been bones of contention for several years. 
 
The protocol calls for transferring an eight-kilometer section of the Odessa-Reini 
highway from Moldova to Ukraine. In exchange Moldova receives seven 
kilometers of the road around the village of Kopanka, and access to the port of 
Giurgiu on the Danube for building an oil terminal. (ITAR-TASS, 1856 GMT, 18 
Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0818, via World News Connection) 
 
After signing the border treaty, Lucinschi said fixing the border and exchanging 
contested territories are "of vital importance for human beings, for families, for 
companies, for businesses. This is what has been casting a shadow on our 
relations so far." (UKRAINIAN TV FIRST PROGRAM, 1800 GMT, 18 Aug 99; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) He explained, however, that more 
work needs to be done. These documents, he said, "give the possibility of settling 
other bilateral issues, including Ukrainian property in Moldova and Moldovan 
property in Ukraine." (ITAR-TASS, 2107 GMT, 19 Aug 99; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
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Newly Independent States: North Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Everyone wins in Dagestan? 
The Russian military has shown that it can push Shamil Basaev's motley band of 
fighters out of Dagestan. Admittedly this represents a leap forward from the 
humiliations of 1995 and 1996, but Russia still lacks any semblance of a political 
strategy to cope with the challenges of ethnic animosities, economic deprivation, 
and religious extremism. 
 
The current operation has been advantageous for all the governments involved. 
Moscow has shown that it can do something besides embezzle foreign aid. In 
Chechnya, President Maskhadov watches as his main rivals' forces and prestige 
are crippled by the attack. In Dagestan, President Magomedali Magomedov 
eliminates his opposition and directs popular outrage over the Basaev raid at the 
local religious sects. Everybody wins. 
 
As early as June and July the federal authorities started to conduct operations 
against the forces of field commanders Shamil Basaev and Khattab which 
operated in the northern part of Chechnya bordering Dagestan. It seemed at the 
time that the air strikes against them were coordinated with the Chechen 
president, Aslan Maskhadov. (See The NIS Observed, 14 Jul 99) In early August 
Basaev and Khattab took over several villages in Dagestan and held an 
assembly that called for a union of Dagestan and Chechnya. These actions 
provoked a further set of reprisals against them. 
 
From the start of the operation, the prospect of destroying other armed 
opposition groups delighted members of Dagestan's regional government. The 
secretary of the Dagestani Security Council, Akhamednadi Magdigadzhiev, 
suggested that the "stabilization measures" should be applied throughout the 
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republic to establish order "once and for all." (ITAR-TASS, 1152 GMT, 18 Aug 
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0820, via World News Connection) Dagestan's government 
has come under criticism for its use of corrupt and authoritarian measures to 
stifle peaceful avenues of political opposition, thereby creating a breeding ground 
for various fanatical paramilitary groups. (See Magomedkhan Magomedkhanov, 
"Dagestan: Rents in the Fabric of Government," Perspective, March-April 1998) 
Shamil Basaev's outing offered the authorities an opportunity to "eliminate" other 
centers of religious resistance to the state. 
 
After two weeks of shelling, Basaev announced that his followers would retreat 
into Chechnya to regroup. Since they were in the area, units of the interior and 
defense ministries "mopped up" several other villages. The offending areas had 
proclaimed an Islamic republic after a failed coup attempt in the spring of 1998 
under the leadership of Nadir Khachilaev. They had persisted in relative calm 
until the events of the last few weeks and had refused to join with Basaev. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 31 Aug 99) Still the opportunity was ripe for 
"cleaning" and a few more God-forsaken villages were summarily "eliminated." 
All in the name of combating terrorists and "Wahhabis" -- a religious sect rapidly 
becoming the favorite bogey of the Central Asian states that is directed from 
abroad and determined to overrun the state. In short, "trotskyites." 
 
Although the federal government may think it has tidied up sufficiently, there is no 
reason to suppose that the fighting will end here. The Dagestani government has 
distributed arms to a 24,000-volunteer militia. They, together with the Russian 
military, are "exposing militant sympathizers from among the local residents." 
(RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, 26 Aug 99, via World News Connection) The 
local population has taken to this task with relish -- raiding mosques, arresting 
suspects, breaking television relays that carried religious programs. Magomedov 
has announced his intention to tighten a 1997 law outlawing Wahhabis. TASS 
reported that local Wahhabis have trimmed their beards to avoid being mistaken 
for members of Basaev's group. (ITAR-TASS, 0646 GMT, 19 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-
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1999-0819, via World News Connection) Now, anyone might be a Wahhabi in 
disguise. This hardly represents a victory of liberal democracy over medieval 
fanaticism! More like a victory of fire and metal over human flesh. 
 
For its part Maskhadov's government showed great restraint, equanimity even, 
towards the deaths of its citizens under the command of a war hero and a former 
deputy prime minister. Maskhadov declared a state of emergency in Chechnya 
and called up reservists. He also reinforced the border with Dagestan: Against 
the possibility of Russian attack? Or a Basaev retreat? One wonders. 
(INTERFAX, 1703 GMT, 21 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0821, via World News 
Connection) The recently appointed minister of foreign affairs of Chechnya, Ilyas 
Akhmadov, said that his government views the fighting in Dagestan as Russia's 
internal affair. However, it disputes the claim that Chechnya exports religious 
extremism to Russia. (GROZNISKY RABOCHIY, 19 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0830, via World News Connection) If some Chechens are participating in the 
fighting, Akhamadov suggests there is little the government can do about it. After 
all, "we can not deprive them of the right to do what they want with their life. Each 
man has a right to his grenade." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Will Russia be rewarded for bad behavior? 
Presenting one possible explanation for Russia's continued attempts to claim 
Baltic abuses of human rights, a report by Russia's non-governmental defense 
and foreign policy council states the belief that the West will not grant security 
guarantees to the Baltic states if there are bad relations between the states and 
Russia. Should this expectation be thwarted and NATO be expanded to include 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Russia would view such a move as an "increase of 
direct military threats." This may create another "district of tension" in the center 
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of Europe, the report adds. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 
GMT, 2 Aug 99) 
 
ESTONIA 
Language law amendments promulgated in part 
While there had been a substantial amount of discussion on proposed 
amendments to the language law which would mandate fluency in Estonian in 
both the public and private sectors, at the end of July the government of Estonia 
opted to implement amendments affecting only employees in the public sector. 
Under the amendments promulgated, public servants, medical personnel, service 
personnel and sole proprietors must be able to use Estonian in offering their 
goods and services. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 27 
Jul 99) Provisions of the law requiring private sector employees to be fluent in 
Estonian have been suspended until they have been "elaborated and altered to 
meet EU requirements," according to Prime Minister Mart Laar. (INTERFAX, 
1558 GMT, 28 Jul 99; via World News Connection) 
 
The mysterious case of the missing rights abuses 
Expecting residents to speak the language of the country in which they reside is 
just one of the purported violations of human rights decried by the Russian 
government. Yet while the government at large may continue to fly that banner, 
some Russian officials have left the parade. Anatoli Tupikin, deputy minister and 
leader of the delegation from the Russian Ministry of Culture to Estonia, says he 
has "not observed any political barriers in the development of our cultural 
cooperation," (RADIO TALLINN NETWORK, 1200 GMT, 30 Jul 99; via World 
News Connection) Clearly, then, ethnic identity is not in danger. Is there, 
perhaps, political persecution? 
 
Not according to the Russian embassy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(although the Duma has a different perspective). The arrest of Oleg Morozov, a 
Russian activist in Estonia who refused to register for a residence permit, and is 
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therefore living in the country illegally, is not seen by the foreign ministry as being 
politically motivated. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 3 
Aug 99) Alas, Sergei Glotov, head of the Russian delegation to the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) and a Duma deputy, disagrees. Glotov 
called on the PACE president, Lord Russel Johnston, "to put an end to serious 
violations of human rights in Estonia," claiming that Morozov was arrested 
because he organized protests to defend the rights of ethnic minorities. Glotov 
further claimed that Russian Embassy representatives were not allowed to meet 
with Morozov, an accusation refuted by the embassy itself, which announced that 
a diplomat had met with Morozov and the latter had no complaints. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 6 Aug 99) Morozov claims, in the 
face of Estonian laws to the contrary, that he does not need to apply for a 
residence permit because he was born and reared in Estonia. 
 
When Morozov began a hunger strike to demand the status of political prisoner 
during his 20-day administrative sentence, the embassy offered no assistance or 
support of his claim of persecution. "It is effectively possible to defend only those 
persons who recognize the laws of their country of residence," an embassy 
statement explained. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1722 GMT, 10 Aug 99; via 
World News Connection) 
 
Even the Estonian United People's Party (EUPP), one of the country's two 
leading parties representing the Russian-speaking population, issued an appeal 
that flew in the face of Morozov's claim. On 11 August the EUPP asked all 
persons without residence permits to legalize their stay in Estonian. The party 
also appealed to the Estonian government to improve the process by which non-
citizens could legalize their status. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1600 GMT, 11 Aug 99) The EUPP supports the integration of Russian speakers 
into Estonian society. 
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Doctors at the Mustamae hospital in Tallinn examined Morozov during his hunger 
strike and said there had been no damage done, although they did recommend 
he begin to eat. Officials at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Russian Embassy in Tallinn also advised Morozov to end his protest. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 16 Aug 99). Morozov did end his 
protest at the end of his sentence, but the story has not ended. The government 
has offered him a residence permit, if he applies, and Morozov continues to 
stand by his refusal. 
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